P2P Loans Risk: Regulation, Cases and Your Own Checks
Translated from the German original, last updated 11 Nov 2026. Read the original (German)
P2P loans are a high-risk investment, and unfortunately that is not just a phrase for the disclaimer. Since 2015, platforms in this industry have collapsed regularly, sometimes through fraud, sometimes through a quiet wind-down without insolvency proceedings, sometimes because of a single lender that stopped making payments. Here I bring together everything that has been published on p2p-game.com on this topic: the documented cases, the patterns behind them, the legal basics and the tools with which you can check a provider yourself beforehand.
Of the cases listed, I was personally invested in at least seven myself, including Grupeer and Envestio, and with Lenndy I am still on a creditor list today. I am also affected by the ongoing Ventus proceedings and declined the invitation to join the creditors' committee, because the body works under a confidentiality agreement and I would then no longer be able to report to you exactly what is discussed there.
For context
Naturally, this page contains no legal advice and no legal assessment. Where platforms give information about their own structure, these are their own statements, which I cannot verify independently. Scores and assessments are a guide, not a verdict. For ongoing proceedings, the official channels of the parties involved and of the supervision are authoritative, not this page.
The three types of risk
Before going into the individual cases, it is worth sorting things out. In simplified terms, P2P has three main types of risk, and each needs a different protection. If you read the cases below without this classification in mind, you will end up drawing the wrong conclusions.
Business model risk
Loans default, whole lenders stumble, the market environment turns. This is the normal risk of every loan. It cannot be switched off, only cushioned. Protection: broad diversification across platforms, loan types and countries.
Fraud risk
The platform was dubious from the start or becomes so along the way. Protection: track record, audited annual financial statements, communication behaviour.
Regulatory risk
The supervision halts the business for purely legal reasons, even in the case of a platform that really operates and pays interest. It is not visible from the outside, and during ongoing operation a missing licence simply goes unnoticed. Protection: check the licence status.
The third category is the one that was overlooked for longest, by me as well. It is covered in detail in the basics article Regulated or not? The P2P risk I personally underestimated. The complete list of risk levels, from the platform through lenders, currency and country risk to the investor themselves, can be found in “Quite a lot of P2P risks that you collect along the way”.
Case chronicle since 2015
What follows here has happened and can happen again in the same form. The list is not complete; it contains the cases that I followed, noticed or was caught up in myself.
| Year | Case | What happened | Pattern |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2015 | TrustBuddy | Insolvency after the creditworthiness check had been manipulated | Fraud |
| 2017 | Eurocent (Mintos) | Lender insolvent, investors saw hardly anything back | Lender default |
| 2018/19 | Collateral, Lendy, Funding Secure, Moneything | Wave of insolvencies in the UK, returns only in fractions | Platform insolvency |
| 2019/20 | Kuetzal, Envestio | Projects did not exist, the management disappeared | Fraud |
| 2019/20 | Aforti, GetBucks, Capital Service, Cashwagon, Monego | Lenders on Mintos stopped payments one after another | Lender default |
| 2020 | Monethera, Wisefund | Envestio copies, down to the FAQ texts | Fraud |
| 2020 | Grupeer | Payout stop, then suspicion of faked loan origins | Fraud |
| 2020 | Fastinvest | Payouts halted, the website is still running today | Fraud |
| 2020 | Finko group with Varks (Mintos) | Licence withdrawal in Armenia dragged down the whole group, the group guarantee did not hold | Lender default |
| 2021 | Wowwo (Mintos) | Turkish car loan provider suspended, lira crash, data connection cut off | Lender default |
| 2021/22 | Lenndy | Insolvency proceedings ongoing, not a cent back for years | Wind-down |
| 2022 | Viventor | Several CEO changes, then the website went offline | Silent wind-down |
| 2022 | Juicy Fields | Exit scam in cannabis crowdgrowing, losses in the three-digit millions | Fraud |
| from 2022 | Kviku, Revo | Funds frozen after the start of the war, no transfers possible | Country risk |
| from 2023 | EstateGuru Deutschland | Loan portfolio collapsed, the platform itself continues to operate | Recovery without insolvency |
| 2024 | Reinvest24, LandEx, Bulkestate, Monestro | Business discontinued or communication dried up | Silent wind-down |
| 2024 | Planet42, Alivio Capital, Right Choice, ClickCash | Lenders stopped payments, double-digit millions outstanding | Lender default |
| 2026 | Nera Capital (Mintos) | Payments suspended, around 61 million euros in delayed notes | Lender default |
| 2026 | Ventus Energy | BaFin prohibits the deposit-taking business, restructuring follows | Regulatory intervention |
The five patterns in detail
Fraud: invented projects and copied platforms
The turn of the year 2019/2020 was the moment the German-speaking community learned mistrust. At Kuetzal and Envestio* it turned out that projects simply did not exist, and Monethera and Wisefund copied the model, FAQ texts included. Grupeer started out respectably and later tipped over, and Fastinvest stopped payouts in April 2020 and still keeps its website online. The full account, with the warning signs that were visible in hindsight, is in Which P2P platform will fail next? (German), and the largest single case outside the P2P world is in Juicy Fields (German).
Silent wind-down: when nothing simply arrives any more
The least spectacular pattern and, in total, the most expensive. No criminal complaint, no proceedings, no headline, just a platform that stops answering. Viventor changed CEO several times and at some point went offline, Bulkestate has in practice long since ceased operating, Reinvest24 fell apart over a dispute with the project partner (at least something was repaid now and then!), and LandEx never became profitable. At Lenndy there is at least a proper insolvency procedure under way. I am on the creditor list and have not seen a cent for years.
Lender defaults: the level below the platform
A platform does not have to collapse for money to disappear. On marketplaces a single lender is enough, and that is where the larger damage has so far occurred in total. Eurocent failed at Mintos as early as 2017, followed in 2019 and 2020 by Aforti, GetBucks, Capital Service, Cashwagon and Monego. The licence withdrawal at Varks in 2020 dragged down the entire Finko group, and the much-advertised group guarantee did not change that. Wowwo was suspended at the end of 2021 after the lira crashed and the company cut the data connection to Mintos. In 2024 Planet42 and Alivio Capital were added, at Bondster ClickCash has been stuck since the end of 2022, and at Income Marketplace the payment plan of Right Choice collapsed.
The currently largest case of this category is ongoing right now. At Nera Capital, an Irish litigation funder, interest payments have been suspended since the end of March 2026, because the British Solicitors Regulation Authority is examining the solvency of around 80 funded law firms, and these have suspended their payments. The repayment due in May did not arrive. According to the available information, around 61 million euros are therefore tied up in delayed notes, and on the secondary market they find no buyers even at a 30 per cent discount. Mintos has not classified Nera as a default so far. If it did, it would be the largest single lender default in the platform's history.
I am exposed to this myself, and through a route that annoys me: the Core strategy picked up precisely these notes for me, without my having selected them individually. Since then Core has been deactivated for me. This is exactly where the buyback guarantee acts as a lever and not as protection, because if a lender fails, its entire portfolio fails at once. What I look for when choosing is in The best Mintos lenders (German), and why I still do not regard buyback as security is in the buyback polemic.
Regulatory intervention: supervision pulls the plug
The most recent pattern and the only one that also hits a platform that is genuinely operating. In May 2026 BaFin prohibited the Ventus Energy Group from conducting deposit-taking business in Germany without a licence, and in June a court-supervised restructuring procedure under Estonian law followed. How this ends is open, and I deliberately do not give my own forecast for the repayment rate. I record the dated course of events in my Ventus Energy review, and the assessment with Lars is in the podcast episode on the restructuring (German).
More interesting than the individual case is the question of who else the same criterion could affect. For this I wrote to 16 unregulated platforms with the same six questions about their legal structure and evaluated the answers using a weighted scheme, which can be read in the BaFin P2P platform risk check.
The range runs from 81 points down to a flat zero for the only provider from which nothing of substance has come to this day. The score expressly measures only how completely and how well evidenced the answers were, not how safe a business model actually is.
Recovery without bankruptcy: the money is not gone, just gone
The special case that many underestimate. EstateGuru is supervised, reports operating profits again and is anything but insolvent. Even so, a three-digit million amount is stuck in recovery, mostly from the German loan portfolio (German). In my own portfolio the platform therefore stands at a 12-month IRR of minus 1.8 per cent, even though the loans are formally secured. The money is not necessarily lost completely, but it is illiquid for years and a large part of it is surely gone too. A licence does not protect against stuck money and mismanagement.
I have worked out once how a single total loss affects the overall portfolio:
even with one position written off completely, an internal rate of return of just under 8 per cent remains over my entire P2P period, and just under 5 per cent in the current year. The calculation, and an example of how borrower and subordination (Rangrücktritt, a creditor's agreement to rank behind other claims) can be read in a real contract, are in Is P2P dead? What the case means for diversification.
Understanding regulation
The core of almost all supervisory problems lies in a single term: deposit-taking business under § 1 KWG. Anyone who accepts funds from the public that are unconditionally repayable is conducting a banking business in Germany that requires a licence. If the licence is missing, BaFin can order cessation and winding-up, with immediate effect and regardless of whether the operating business is running.
The three ways out of deposit-taking business
Purchase of claims (claim assignment): The investor buys existing loan claims and does not give the platform a loan. As a result, there is no unconditional repayment claim against the platform.
Subordination or qualified subordination agreement (Rangrücktritt): Repayment is subordinated in the event of insolvency and blocked before insolvency. German courts, however, have repeatedly struck down such clauses when they were worded too opaquely.
ECSP or MiFID regulation: Segregated client money and ongoing supervision take the business out of the scope of deposit-taking. Art. 8 of the ECSP Regulation also prohibits financing the platform's own projects.
Which licence types exist at all and where their limits lie is covered in detail in the basic article on regulatory risk. The important point: only MiFID II comes with investor compensation, and it applies solely to platform insolvency or misappropriation, not to loan defaults.
The EstateGuru case above shows what a licence does not do. I keep the up-to-date status of the individual providers in my P2P platform rating.
Key to the regulation badges
In my P2P loans review, each platform name is followed by a "badge" showing its supervision status. The definitions are identical on both pages, and here they are written out in full:
ECSP = licence under the EU Crowdfunding Regulation, granted by a national supervisory authority.
MiFID II = investment firm licence, usually from the Latvian or Lithuanian central bank.
supervised = the platform or the lender behind it is under national financial supervision, without an ECSP licence.
not regulated = no financial supervision. In P2P this is still the normal case and not an exclusion criterion either, but you need to be clear about what it can mean.
Incidentally, a licence does not protect against loan defaults. It provides supervision, reporting obligations and an orderly procedure if things go wrong.
Which platforms are regulated?
Regulatory status is the only risk factor in this article that can be checked from the outside in a few minutes. Among others, LANDE, Lendermarket, Debitum, Savy, Digilo, Profitus, InRento, Stock.estate, Crowdpear and Afranga hold an ECSP licence. Nectaro, Twino and ViaInvest operate under MiFID II, and among others Mintos, Neo Finance, Finbee, Capitalia, EstateGuru, InSoil and Indemo are under national supervision. For Bondora, Monefit and Modena, it is the lender behind the product that is under supervision, not the investment product itself.
The full assignment with licence type per provider is in the overview under Which P2P platforms are regulated?, and you will find the badges for each platform directly in the segment tables.
In my own portfolio, around 65 per cent of the capital is currently on regulated platforms, and the target is well above two thirds.
Notes from my dataAs of 12 Nov 2026
Official warnings and measures
- Lonvestnot regulated, on the Latvijas Banka listAs of 12 Nov 2026Data on LonvestSource for Lonvest
- MacLearCNMV warning 05/2026As of 12 Nov 2026Data on MacLearSource for MacLear
- MilleaLatvijas Banka warning list 09/2026As of 12 Nov 2026Data on MilleaSource for Millea
- Ventus EnergyBaFin winding-up orderAs of 12 Nov 2026Source for Ventus Energy
Irregularities in the key figures
- Devon2025 accounts missing, deletion noticeAs of 12 Nov 2026Data on Devon
- Estateguru69% of the portfolio non-performingAs of 12 Nov 2026Data on Estateguru
- InSoil (ehem. Heavy Finance)23% of the portfolio in defaultAs of 12 Nov 2026Data on InSoil (ehem. Heavy Finance)
- Robocashstructural risk from the group's Russia linkAs of 12 Nov 2026Data on Robocash
Checking platforms yourself
Part of the risk can be assessed beforehand with manageable effort. The following articles are tools, not ready-made verdicts, and they work best in combination.
Warning signs of investment fraud
The basic article, before getting into numbers. Frequent CEO changes, identical project descriptions, rising payout fees, evasive answers to targeted questions, changing bank details. In hindsight, these signals were visible in almost all the cases above, just not clearly enough to act on them alone.
Fundamental analysis: 30 platforms stress-tested
Seven factors for assessing platform risk from the outside: company address, legal form and commercial register number, time in the market, key figures from the annual financial statements, borrower and lender diversification, reviews. In a guest article, Raphael used them to examine 30 providers. The methodology still holds today, while the ratings from back then are historical documents.
Benford analysis: anomalies in the loan book
If a platform discloses its loan book, the distribution of leading digits can be tested against Benford's law. Marc's pioneering analysis from 2019 found irregularities at three of four platforms, and Fastinvest and Grupeer stopped payouts in the months afterwards. The catch in 2026: since many providers switched to notes, Bondora is the only large European platform with a fully public loan book.
Buyback: curse or blessing?
The buyback guarantee is the most misunderstood construct in the industry, and the lender defaults above show why. In this polemic, Andreas and Thomas Maurer argue directly against each other: one presents buyback as a balancing of interests between lender and investor, the other as an insurance premium that fails exactly when you need it. Both positions stand side by side unchanged.
Excel matrix for your own selection
If you want your own weighting rather than my finished verdict, here is Ömer's selection matrix, now extended to 75 platforms. Define criteria, weight them, assign points, set a minimum threshold. The stored values are plausible estimates from public sources and are expressly meant as a starting point, not as verified truth.
Perspective from the community
Two podcast episodes round this off. In the community edition (German), Lars and I answer your questions on which three platforms we each consider the lowest-risk and why we categorically reject borrowed capital for P2P. In the episode with fee-only adviser Thomas Beutler (German), the headwind arrives: he would never invest in P2P, because the risk of a total loss is an exclusion criterion for him. We argued the other side, but we did not convince him.
Lars P2P Premium Rating, not just the Mintos lender
Lars P2P Kredite Premium Rating-System* is a valuable tool for investors in the P2P lending area who are looking for a curated rating.
It offers a comprehensive analysis of the lenders by taking into account numerous key figures such as profitability, revenue, equity and debt ratio.
Frequently asked questions about risk and regulation
Which P2P platforms have failed so far?
The list runs from TrustBuddy in 2015, through the wave of British insolvencies around Lendy and Collateral, to the fraud cases Kuetzal, Envestio, Monethera, Wisefund, Grupeer and Fastinvest around 2020. There are also quiet wind-downs such as Viventor, Lenndy, Bulkestate, Reinvest24, LandEx and Monestro. The complete chronicle with year and pattern is at the top of this page.
What does regulatory risk mean for P2P loans?
Regulatory risk means that a supervisory authority stops the business on purely legal grounds, regardless of whether the platform actually operates and pays interest. In Germany this usually concerns deposit-taking under § 1 KWG (the German Banking Act): anyone who accepts unconditionally repayable funds from investors needs a licence. If it is missing, the BaFin (the German financial supervisory authority) can order the business to cease and be wound down.
Is a regulated P2P platform automatically safe?
No. A licence removes the regulatory risk, but it does not prevent loan defaults or the insolvency of individual lenders. ECSP investments are protected neither by a deposit guarantee scheme nor by investor compensation. Only MiFID II brings compensation of up to 20,000 Euro, and that applies solely in the case of platform insolvency or misappropriation. At EstateGuru, despite supervision, a three-digit million amount is stuck in recovery.
Does a platform have to go bankrupt for me to lose money?
No, and that is the more common case. On marketplaces the default of a single lender is enough: its entire portfolio then fails at once and the buyback guarantee no longer applies. Examples are Eurocent in 2017, Varks and the Finko group in 2020, Wowwo in 2021, and Planet42 and Alivio Capital in 2024. Currently it affects Nera Capital, with around 61 million euros in delayed notes.
How do I check myself whether a P2P platform is regulated?
ECSP licences are listed in ESMA's central register. The national supervisory authorities in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia keep their own lists of licensed providers and in some cases also warning lists. For unauthorised business with a German connection, the BaFin publishes consumer notices. I keep the status of the platforms I follow up to date in the P2P platform rating and as a badge in the reviews.
This page keeps growing, and every new case goes into the chronicle. How do you handle it now: do you check the licence status before a platform goes into your portfolio, or does the return count most in the end? And which case have I forgotten in the chronicle?