A whole lot of risks that you bring into your portfolio with P2P loans!
Translated from the German original, last updated 10 Nov 2026. Read the original (German)
In this basics article on P2P loan risks, I show you which risks can lurk in your P2P investment and how varied they are. You will also learn, very concretely, how you can minimise many of these P2P risks in order to get the most out of your P2P loan investments.
After all, only those who know the risks of an investment well should look more closely at the opportunities.
What P2P loans are in general, how to tell them apart, and which different interests, roles, platforms, lenders and borrowers exist was discussed in the first part of a basics podcast, which you are welcome to listen to.
The P2P loan risks (as of 2026)
Introduction

Anyone who has followed my blog and my work for a while knows that I never tire of pointing out the risks of investing in P2P loans.
With all the opportunities from the high advertised interest rates (which in 2026 are again quite often above 12-15%) and the success stories propagated by many (of course partly by me too) in the form of double-digit return results (XIRR), which naturally are also meant to motivate dear readers to diligently follow the affiliate links, you must always remain aware of the dormant risks you are taking on.
The year 2025 in particular, with rising corporate insolvencies in Europe, showed that the "risk-free" interest account does not exist. So let us now go through the P2P loan risks one by one, from the very top, the P2P platform, down to you as the investor.
The P2P platform risk
Let us start with the top level for us as investors.
The actual platform and its operator, such as Mintos* or Bondora*.
Which risks do I see here in direct connection with the P2P platforms?
What is the fraud risk (platform) / P2P fraud & SCAM
Above all, the spectacular cases and figures from the past in China (in just one case it involved billions and almost a quarter of a million affected customers) have made it clear to us that fraudulent intent can be directly behind a P2P platform.
This ranges from completely fabricated systems that only show profits virtually and make payouts impossible, to elaborate snowball or Ponzi schemes, which can "hold up" much longer.
This could be seen historically with Kuetzal, Envestio (German) and Monethera (German).
Grupeer also had to be added to the list of fraudulent P2P loan platforms!
And the Juicy Fields scam (German) (albeit agricultural crowdfunding) belongs here as well.
A completely new phenomenon is AI fraud (deepfakes). Fraudsters use artificial intelligence to fake video calls with CEOs or to generate deceptively genuine licences. Do not blindly trust your eyes in video calls any more!
What all these cases have in common is that "investors" usually have to expect a 100% total loss.
What can be done about the fraud risk?
You probably cannot protect yourself 100% against it, but a few criteria do help when assessing the risk:
- How long has the platform been on the market (track record)?
- Are there audited financial statements (audited reports)?
- Check the commercial register extract.
- Most important update: Is it regulated? Make sure to look for the ECSP licence (European Crowdfunding Service Providers) or a banking licence. Platforms without this licence now operate in a "grey area" and should be avoided.
- Internet research on the platform and its founders (LinkedIn).
- The address exists and is not just a shell company (P.O. Box).
- Does support respond promptly and professionally?
- Has the platform ever been "visited" by bloggers?
- Are there opinions or reports on it from independent sources?
Read my detailed article on investment fraud and how to spot a scam in good time.
There are many warning signs to look out for.
Insolvencies of P2P lending platforms
Even a reputable platform has to operate profitably one day. If it does not, and it can no longer find anyone to fund it, insolvency inevitably follows.
In that case, an insolvency administrator usually steps in and winds the company down.
This has happened with:
- Collateral in England
- Lendy in England
- Trustbuddy in Sweden
- Comunitae in Spain
- Funding Secure in England
- Moneything in England
- Lenndy in Lithuania
- This is only a modest selection, and the list keeps growing!
The "EstateGuru phenomenon" 2025/2026:
A special case is EstateGuru. The platform itself is not insolvent (as of 2026) and even reports operating profits again. But the huge German loan portfolio has collapsed. Investors' money is stuck here ("recovery drag"). EstateGuru is working with debt collection partners (Steinberg Management) on recovery, but the German mills grind slowly. The money is not necessarily gone, but it is illiquid for years and will probably only come back with losses. This shows that even without a platform failure, an entire country portfolio can effectively default.
In such a case, an investor does not necessarily have to expect a total loss, but insolvencies (or recoveries, as with EstateGuru) drag on for several years and of course cost money too.
So I personally would first write off my deposit there 100% as well, and be pleased afterwards if anything ever came back.
At the latest, it would be an effective loss for me if, as an investor, I had to actively pursue my claims myself, preferably in Lithuanian (by the way: did you dutifully download and archive all the loan agreements on every platform...?).
To my knowledge, hardly any of the investors in the platforms mentioned saw all their money again ...
What can be done about insolvency risk?
In my opinion, you can only protect yourself against this to a limited extent.
Perhaps it helps to read and understand the balance sheets?
But who trusts themselves to decide with certainty that a platform is going to run out of money?
Alternatively, reading along diligently in forums can help, as you may pick up the odd indication there, but what if that is just hysteria?
Of course, classic risk diversification also helps, as with practically all risk considerations in this field.
In general: the more broadly I spread my money across components that ideally depend little on one another (are not correlated) (forms of investment, platforms, loan types, lenders, countries, currencies and loans), the smaller the potential damage I suffer.
The probability of each individual risk occurring is of course left unaffected.
Insolvencies of individual lenders
It is not only whole platforms that can fail. It is enough if individual lenders on marketplaces (usually buyback P2P lending platforms such as Mintos*) default.
Even then, it becomes protracted or hopeless before an investor gets their money.
On Mintos, for example, the lender Eurocent defaulted as early as 2017, followed later by Aforti, Rapido Finance and Monego.
More recently, the Russia-Ukraine war added further Russian originators (e.g. Kviku, Revo), which froze investors' money or could not transfer it.
This shows plainly: buyback is a promise, not a guarantee.
Liquidity risk on P2P lending platforms (2026 update)
Of course platforms need liquidity too, if only to handle deposits and withdrawals.
But that is not my main concern here. If liquidity runs out, sooner or later we are talking about insolvency.
I would briefly take the special case of Bondora Go & Grow* as an example (other platforms such as Monefit SmartSaver are working on similar products), where high, daily liquidity is advertised.
If you then look more closely at the terms and conditions, it quickly becomes clear that this is only guaranteed to the extent that the company's liquid funds allow.
If in doubt, the payout can also be suspended or split into instalments!
Important change in 2025: Bondora has closed its secondary market and the API. This means you can no longer sell your loans manually to other investors. Liquidity now depends 100% on the "Go & Grow" product and on Bondora's ability to manage payouts. In addition, a uniform interest rate of up to 6% with no limit has applied since 2025, but the dependence on the platform's liquidity has increased.
You can compare this well with the problems of the "open-ended property funds", which also suggested high liquidity and then ran into trouble in 2010 and were closed.
In some cases the winding-up is still ongoing today.
The delays that occurred with the Mintos* Invest & Access product during phases of low interest rates showed that this can happen as well.
The stock market crisis caused by Corona in 2020 also showed in a very tangible way that the much-praised liquidity at Bondora* is not fully available under stress.
Investors had to wait for weeks until their Go&Grow deposits were paid out again bit by bit (at least no default, "only" a delay).
What can be done about liquidity risk?
Anyone who absolutely depends on high liquidity should stick with a deposit-protected instant-access savings or current account, or keep their money under the mattress, and avoid liquid product promises in the high-risk area.
Fraud risk from the P2P borrower
The most prominent example in this category is Advanon, a former platform from Switzerland.
Here a fraudster cost investors more than 2 million € https://www.moneytoday.ch/news/betrugsfall-advanon-welche-luecke-der-betrueger-ausgenutzt-hat/
The platform no longer exists in that form.
Whether the investors ever saw any money from the fraudster is beyond my knowledge.
On a small scale this certainly happens again and again, for example with
Golf Tours, a borrower who took out money on two platforms at once (Linked Finance* and Flender*) and then absconded abroad, or also at Bondora*, which has its own status for this (criminal case).
Also worth reading is Inga's report, who fell victim to fraudsters at Auxmoney*, and how much interest the platform had in preventing that.
What can be done about borrower fraud risk?
In such cases you depend entirely on the quality of the platform's credit assessment;
I think doing that myself is illusory.
Here, as in most other risk cases, the only thing that helps is diversification.
Default risk of a single P2P loan
First of all, it is completely normal for a loan to default.
If it did not, there would be no risk premiums in the form of a (higher) interest rate.
Defaults can range from less than one per cent up to double-digit percentages and still be priced in (i.e. worthwhile for you overall).
As part of my look at diversification, I showed in simplified form how many loans may default without hurting returns.
It only becomes critical when defaults rise higher than expected (e.g. through a massive deterioration of the market environment, that is a downturn or recession, as we have experienced in 2023-2025).
Here we have to distinguish between two cases, with and without buyback, or rather let us call it a buyback promise.
P2P loans without a buyback promise - classic P2P without buyback
In the simple case without buyback, the higher defaults simply feed through to the return.
Many Bondora investors know this: even without an explicit crisis, their own portfolio loses a great deal of its projected return and can even turn negative (although a lot is also recovered in the subsequent recovery, and the overall portfolio can then turn positive again, but that is another story).
What can be done about classic default risk?
You can arm yourself well against this with a few measures:
- Choose a platform with a reasonable track record on default figures. Hardly any has one that goes back further than Bondora*, but Finbee* can also offer several years (I have collected default rates in the context of the diversification analysis).
- On the one hand, of course, diversification across as many different loans on the platform as possible, ideally 300 or more (depending on the expected default rate).
- Secondly, trust in the recovery, do not sell cheaply in a panic (with Bondora that is no longer possible anyway since the secondary market was closed), and be able to sit it out, even for years (1-2 years is the rule for debt collection, thanks to the court and the bailiff [cf. Neofinance*]).
P2P loans with a buyback promise - the popular P2P buyback
The reason why many investors love buyback loans is obvious, of course: the

supposed security they convey: investing without risk.
In the event of a default, as an investor I get my money back, usually with all the interest and possibly any penalty fees, from the lender, and from that point on I am rid of the loan and of the topic of recovery.
That is the "good case", and it happens thousands of times without any problems at all.
But one has to be clear that buyback is a promise by the loan lender to carry out this buyback.
However, this only works for as long as the lender is financially able to do so.
Since most of them are set up similarly to a German GmbH, there is often not much in the way of assets to expect here beyond the returns they have earned.
From the past we know the case of Eurocent, which offered loans on Mintos* and also provided them with a buyback guarantee.
Eurocent got into financial difficulties and filed for insolvency.
To this day, investors have at least got part of their money back, but by far not all of it.
The buyback guarantee should therefore be understood as a risk lever: not many individual loans default in a crisis, but the lender's entire portfolio does (cluster risk).
What can be done about buyback risk?
That is also the reason why I do not only rely on buyback loans and, for example, hold larger positions in classic P2P at EstateGuru*, Linked Finance or Finbee.
But in my opinion there are further measures, even with buyback loans, to

minimise or spread the risk. With lenders too, diversification is key. Don't put all your eggs in one basket!
So I hold quite a lot of lenders in my portfolio, not only on Mintos* but also via other platforms, so that the default of one lender does not hit me too hard.
Beyond that, you can of course also go to the trouble of scrutinising each individual lender, studying and assessing their annual reports.
I don't have the time for that, but perhaps you do ;).
As the market leader, Mintos has taken some of the work off our hands here and publishes a ranking (Risk Score) of its loan lenders, on the basis of which one can decide how heavily to weight them in one's portfolio, or not.
How far one trusts Mintos here is up to each individual (incidentally, in the past some shaky candidates were downgraded only a few hours before the default...), and the alternative involves a lot of work...

And of course I rely to some extent on the platforms, which after all have no interest in a lender going insolvent on them and should monitor them accordingly.
Currency risk when investing in non-euro P2P loans
Some platforms such as Mintos* offer loans in the local currency, such as Kazakh tenge or Polish zloty. In the past, rouble loans with high interest rates were also popular, which brings us to the next point.
The foreign currency loses value
Many "weak" foreign currencies often lose value over time or are at least extremely volatile.
This leverages one's return accordingly in one direction or the other, and in my opinion, with "weak" currencies in particular, often in the negative direction.
For example, with the Kazakh tenge or the Turkish lira, one has lost massively in recent years.
This was particularly drastic with the Russian rouble after the start of the war in Ukraine.
Here, loans were often frozen and an exchange was hardly possible any more.

Extra costs: exchange fees
Mintos* and other marketplaces charge fees on every currency exchange, which come off the return.
This varies by currency, but it reduces the profit immediately.
More complicated for tax
Currency gains, if one is lucky enough to make any, naturally have to be taxed accordingly, and it seems to me that there are differing opinions on how exactly this should be done.
To be completely sure, probably only a tax adviser can help.
What can be done about currency risk?
Personally, I currently avoid currency risk in my P2P investments for the most part by investing almost only in euros.
The theoretically possible extra return is not worth the effort to me, and above all not the risk I would take on for it. The geopolitical events of recent years have confirmed that for me.
Of course you can cover your currency risk by hedging, but that would also be too much effort and calculation for me.
After all, hedging costs money and therefore return, otherwise banks would not offer it.
Whether it is worthwhile would have to be carefully weighed up.
Country risk (geopolitics)
Some P2P borrowers are based in rather unstable regions.
Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine has shown that a theoretical "country risk" can turn into a total loss overnight.
Since then, loans in Ukraine or Russia have been blocked or lost for many investors.
When investing, one should therefore be well aware that wars or political unrest can endanger the entire investment in a country.
What can be done about country risk?
I see two options: avoid these countries altogether or
underweight them accordingly, or do what I always preach anyway: diversify broadly to cushion the risk of loss to a good degree.
Political risks from state intervention in lending
Regulatory risk (2026 update: the Ventus case)
This is a risk I underestimated myself for a long time. It is closely related to the ECSP topic in the next section, but not the same: purely regulatory risk. I do not mean that a platform commits fraud or that its business model does not work. I mean the case where a supervisory authority steps in and stops the business for purely legal reasons, because a mandatory licence is missing. This can also affect a platform that really operates and is honestly run.
This became concrete in 2026 with the case of Ventus Energy. In a decision dated 5 May 2026, BaFin ordered Ventus Energy Group OÜ to immediately cease and wind down its deposit-taking business, which it operated without a licence. The reasoning: the platform accepted unconditionally repayable funds from investors in Germany on the basis of loan agreements, and in BaFin's view thereby conducted deposit-taking business requiring a licence under the Kreditwesengesetz (German Banking Act). It is important to put this in context: this is a legal assessment of the contract structure, not an accusation of fraud.
And this is not an isolated case. The Latvian central bank keeps a public list of firms without a licence for investment services in Latvia (as of 31 March 2026, fifteen names). Interestingly, the list contains not only acute problem cases but also platforms that have been running for years and pay out normally. So licence status says nothing about the quality of the work, only about whether a legal framework and supervision exist in a worst-case scenario. According to the central bank, those who invest in firms without the relevant licence are not covered by investor protection there.
What can be done about regulatory risk?
The good news: unlike business model risk, this risk can be assessed with manageable effort. You do not have to read balance sheets, you just need to know where to look.
- ECSP licences are listed in the central register of ESMA. If a platform is not listed there, it has no ECSP licence.
- The national supervisory authorities in the Baltics keep their own lists of licensed providers and in part warning lists (see Latvijas Banka above).
- For business with a German connection, BaFin publishes consumer notices when it takes action against a provider.
- It is worth looking at the contract documents. Watch for the keyword "Nachrang" (subordination): through a qualified subordination clause, an investment is often structured so that it is formally not deposit-taking business requiring a licence. If this clause fails in court, that is exactly where a regulatory problem can arise.
I have devoted a separate in-depth article to this topic: Regulated or not? The P2P risk that I personally underestimated.
Regulation & formalities (2026 update: ECSP)
For a long time, the P2P market in the Baltics was hardly regulated. That has changed massively in the meantime.
With the introduction of the European Crowdfunding Service Providers Regulation (ECSP), there are now stricter rules, but also more security for investors.
Platforms such as Mintos, Debitum or Lande are now regulated investment firms.
At Mintos one now invests in "notes" (debt securities), which brings new structural risks (issuer risk of the special purpose vehicle) but also creates more transparency.

Nevertheless, even as a Mintos* investor you are not immune to a block on deposits of larger sums suddenly being activated, so that you have to explain where the money comes from (KYC/AML checks).
This serves to combat money laundering, but it can be annoying.
What can be done about regulatory risks?
There is probably nothing you can do about it, but you can also see it positively. Such regulations will complicate processes and thus make them more expensive, but for investors they can also ensure that minimum standards are met and that at least the crudest or most obvious cases of fraud become harder.
Admittedly, they do not protect 100% against insolvencies either (see collateral).
Country-specific taxes (withholding tax chaos 2026)
When investing abroad, one always runs the risk of having to pay withholding tax in the country of origin on the interest income.
In 2026 the topic is hotter than ever:
- Latvia (Mintos, Debitum, Twino): A withholding tax of 5% often applies here for private EU investors. In Germany, this 5% can be credited against the capital gains tax (Kapitalertragssteuer).
- Lithuania (PeerBerry, Crowdpear): The standard withholding tax here is often 15%. The problem: the double taxation treaty (DBA) often only provides for a credit of 10%. To reduce the tax to 10% or even 0%, you often have to submit a certificate of residence (DAS-1 form). Anyone who forgets this gives away return!
What can be done about the tax risk?
The withholding tax can be credited against your own tax liability, in some cases in full, otherwise at least in part.
Details can be found at the Bundeszentralamt für Steuern (Federal Central Tax Office). With some platforms you can also be exempted or have the rate reduced;
this requires the mentioned certificate of residence under the double taxation agreement from the Bundesfinanzverwaltung (German federal tax administration), which is a fairly manageable effort.
In addition, offsetting of losses in Germany ("endgültiger Ausfall", final default) remains complex and often only possible after years.
The P2P investor as a risk
I am glad you have stuck with it this far.
Actually, this point belongs right at the front: it is where you have the most in your own hands and can manage this risk.
Greed and lack of diversification
High interest rates and similar return expectations will surely make the old saying "greed eats brains" come true for some.
Where does the return come from? Of course, from risk. How high must the risk be to offer a return of 12% and more in a normal interest rate environment?
What can be done about me as a risk?
Sometimes it is enough to simply take a small step back and make this clear to yourself.
Offers that seem too good to be true often are.
One should neither believe everything, nor make by far the biggest mistake of going "all in".
Even if you perhaps come out with slightly less return in the end, in my opinion good asset management is not per se profit maximisation, but fundamentally risk minimisation.
Even though in the P2P environment I do in many places strive for maximum return, I do not do so across my whole asset portfolio.
There P2P makes up only a small part of my assets. At the global level I largely follow the Komme strategy from "Souverän investieren mit Indexfonds und ETFs";
I will also write a few more words on that elsewhere.
I also consider a significantly higher weighting "risky", and from 20% upwards only suitable for people who know (or believe they know) what they are doing.
For me personally it would not be an option.
And within my P2P investments too I diversify massively, at all levels and across loan types such as real estate projects, business loans and consumer loans, to be as broadly positioned as possible, so that a crisis, slump or total loss does not drag the whole segment down with it.
The lack of liquidity
P2P loans as an asset class are only liquid to a limited extent. Even if lenders advertise them that way (see above), the money is often tied up for months and up to several years.
This is not even due to extraordinary events, but simply because there are also long-term loans of several years, which I like to include in my portfolio.
If recovery processes come on top of that, it tends to extend by further years.
So all in all, not a good basis for high liquidity.
What can be done about liquidity risks?
This is mitigated, however, by the fact that with high diversification there are regular cash inflows from interest payments, repayments and buybacks.
Many platforms also offer a secondary market for loan shares;
on this, depending on the condition of the loan, loans can be sold without major costs (if there are buyers).
But be careful: As mentioned above, some platforms (Bondora) are now closing this market or restricting it. Check before investing whether an "exit" is possible at all!
Illness or the finale: death and inheritance
A topic that I have also covered in much more depth elsewhere. (German) It is clear to everyone: one day, and unfortunately usually rather unexpectedly, the end of our own life comes, or a situation in which we are, for whatever reason, no longer able to act for ourselves for a longer period.
With ordinary domestic accounts and securities accounts this is regulated quite well: with the relevant power of attorney or a certificate of inheritance (Erbschein), authorised persons get access to them.
With foreign ones it is already somewhat harder, and with P2P probably significantly more so again.
Whether the non-established platforms in particular have a process for this at all?
And then the relevant knowledge also has to be passed on about what is to be done with the accounts, or
what all of this even is...
What can be done about life?
I am not yet 100% "clean" in this respect either.
At least I have recorded all my login details centrally in a password safe (Keepass a free solution) and I regularly pass them on to the people who are relevant to me.
The guide on how to deal with all the accounts & custody accounts is still missing. I can hardly say: "Read the hundreds of posts on my blog, then it will all fall into place" :)
Conclusion on the P2P loan risks
With my own death in view at the latest, I should have driven off the last of my readers, and I can now save myself the affiliate links ;) Nevertheless, it matters to me, even if many may find it annoying, to state clearly that this form of investment carries quite a lot of risks, which everyone should be aware of and enter into knowingly. And not blindly, because exorbitant returns are advertised for P2P loans or because all the "others" do it, with the P2P loan risks being ignored. And why you should put yourselves through all of this anyway, you can read in the P2P loan opportunities article...
If I have overlooked a risk, or in your view assessed one wrongly, please use the comments. I am always glad to receive your feedback in any case!